Live demo · fictional survey vendor: Acme Engineering
Loading survey…
This is a real, working integration of CandidSignal into a survey, not a mockup.
CandidSignal is the trust layer in the middle: it never sees who you are and never
sees your answer, so it has nothing to leak and nothing to sell. The vendor below
(Acme Engineering) is the one that knows your identity, exactly like it does today.
Log in as a fake employee below and answer honestly-or-not, it doesn't matter: watch
each cryptographic step happen live, try to respond twice, and finish by verifying
your own receipt in the public tamper-evident log. No account, no trust required.
1 · Log in to the survey
The vendor is the only party that knows who you are. When you log in it issues a
one-time eligibility voucher: a signed note saying “this person is allowed to
respond,” with no way to tie it to the answer you’ll give.
2 · Your response
What just happened, cryptographically
Each line is a real step your browser and CandidSignal's trust services performed, not a simulation.
✓ Response recorded. Here is your proof
This receipt is your evidence that your answer was counted. It is bound to your
answer by cryptography, and it is not linked to your name. Keep the
token hash if you want to verify your response in the public log (step 4).
Token hash (your entry in the log)
Receipt signature
You’ve already responded
The system refused a second token for you. Notice how it refused.
The vendor can’t see which stored answer is yours (there is no name on any answer),
so it couldn’t have blocked you. The refusal came from the token issuer, which
remembers it has already vouched for you once without ever learning what you
answered. One person, one response, still anonymous.
3 · What the vendor sees
Every stored answer, exactly as the vendor holds it. There is no name, no user id,
and no way to trace any row back to a person, including yours.
No responses yet.
4 · Verify your own receipt in the log
CandidSignal publishes a tamper-evident transparency log and locates your entry
by token hash. You don’t have to trust us: run the public audit CLI (below) against
the published files and confirm your receipt is really in the signed log.